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Abstract 
We investigate national greenhouse gases mitigation objectives, labeled as carbon voluntarism, in the context of 
contemporary globalized finance-led capitalism. Using principal components analysis and clustering, we delineate a 
typology of OECD and BRICS countries from the standpoint of the assumed underpinnings of carbon voluntarism: the 
productive structure of the economy, the relative position in global GHG chains, the levels of income and capitalist 
development, the political demand for the environment, the class structure of GHG emissions and financialization. 
The least carbon voluntary countries appear to be at the beginning of global GHG chains and to rely heavily on the 
primary sector. They have a weak political demand for the environment and a more unequal class structure of 
emissions. The most carbon voluntary countries have a higher political demand for the environment, a more equal 
class structure of emissions, weaker financialization, and greater reliance on the tertiary sector. These countries are 
also net importers of GHG emissions. 
 
Key words: capitalism; carbon voluntarism; climate change; COP21; financialization; global GHG chains; 
greenhouse gases; political demand for the environment 
 
Résumé 
On s’intéresse aux objectifs de réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre (GES) (le volontarisme carbone) dans 
le contexte du capitalisme globalisé et tiré par la finance. A partir d’une analyse en composante principale et d’une 
classification, on esquisse une typologie des pays de notre échantillon (OCDE et BRICS) basée sur les déterminants 
hypothétiques du volontarisme carbone : le tissu productif des économies, la position relative dans les chaines 
globales de GES, les niveaux de revenu et de développement capitaliste, la demande politique d’environnement, la 
structure de classe des émissions et le processus de financiarisation. Les pays les moins volontaristes sont ceux situés 
au début des chaines globales de GES et dont le secteur primaire est le plus important. Ils ont une faible demande 
politique d’environnement et une structure de classe des émissions plus inégale. Les pays les plus volontaires ont 
une demande politique d’environnement supérieure, une structure de classe des émissions plus égalitaire, la 
financiarisation y est moins importante et la tertiarisation plus poussée. Ils sont également importateurs nets de 
GES. 
 
Mots-clefs : capitalisme ; volontarisme carbone ; changement climatique ; COP21 ; financiarisation ; chaine globale 
de GES ; gaz à effet de serre ; demande politique d’environnement 
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1 Introduction 
The agreement reached at the COP21 in Paris in December 2015 has been unanimously 
acclaimed as a historical progress in the struggle against climate change. Yet this agreement 
merely paves the way for future action, but does not contain in itself any constrained 
commitment to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. In the months preceding the 
COP21, participating countries submitted their Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(INDCs) through which they exposed their objectives of GHG mitigation by 2030. The future 
success of the Paris agreement lies in the ability or the willingness of participating countries 
to commit to their INDC and to improve it for each quinquennial revision scheduled by the 
agreement. In their current state, the INDCs are insufficient to limit climate change to an 
increase of 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, as explicitly recognized in the 
agreement itself (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015, p. 3, 
paragraph 17). It is therefore crucial to understand what determines the stance of countries 
regarding GHG mitigation, or as we call it in the reminder of this paper, carbon voluntarism. 
In economics, the literature on international environmental agreements (IEA) pertains mainly 
to game theory. IEA are analyzed as cooperative and non-cooperative games between 
countries depicted as rational agents acting individually or collectively to maximize their 
payoff function of mitigating their emissions or not in the absence of a supranational 
constraining mechanism (Barrett, 1994; 2005; Tulkens, 1997; 2015; Nordhaus, 2015). The 
game theory approach to IEA is close to the neorealist school in International Political 
Economy (IPE) that represents countries as rational individuals taking decisions on the basis 
of a cost-benefit analysis (Cohen, 2007). From this perspective, States would merely take part 
in IEA depending on their strategic interest to secure or expand their power (Roberts et al., 
2004). If they offer a way to model and interpret the bargaining process itself, these 
approaches do not explain the underpinnings of these strategic behaviors: Beyond strategic 
and opportunistic purposes, carbon voluntarism might be the organic product of a 
combination of economic and socio-political factors historically located. These underpinnings 
have to be taken into account to comprehend the emergence of new global climate regulations 
in the historical context of contemporary globalized finance-led capitalism. Building on the 
institutionalist perspectives of the Régulation school (Boyer, 2015) and to a lesser extent of 
the Diversity of capitalisms (Amable, 2005), our stance is to base the analysis on the 
underpinnings that we assume to capture some structural features of contemporary capitalism 
and to have a link with the countries’ carbon voluntarism. We focus on the OECD and the 
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BRICS countries. Another interesting way to follow – perhaps more representative of the 
diversity of capitalisms methodology - would have been to start from various features of 
climate policies (carbon taxes, carbon markets, subsidies to renewable energies…) to 
delineate a diversity of institutional arrangements regarding climate. Such an approach has 
been adopted in Elie et al. (2012) who investigate the “diversity of environmental institutional 
devices” and find that they match to some extent with the five capitalisms of Amable (2005). 
Although they focus on low income countries and include much more variables in their 
analysis than we do – in particular geographical or demographic variables - our structural 
approach is more akin to the one followed in Costantini et al. (2016) who investigate 
structural determinants of alliances between developing countries regarding climate 
negotiations. We do believe both kinds of approaches are actually relevant and 
complementary. 
The reminder of the paper goes as follows: The second part of the paper explains the 
theoretical relationships between the assumed underpinnings and carbon voluntarism, the 
third part details the empirical methodology, the fourth part describes the results and the fifth 
part discusses them. A conclusion follows. 
2 Linking carbon voluntarism to economic and socio-political factors 
We conceptualize carbon voluntarism as the product of interactions within countries between 
socio-political and economic spheres and within global capitalism between countries and/or 
areas of accumulation that cohabitate in global value chains, which are also chains of GHG 
emissions. The underpinnings we consider are national economic interests, through the 
productive structure and the relative position in global GHG chains; national ecological 
preferences, through the levels of income and capitalist development and the political demand 
for the environment; and internal class dynamics, through financialization and the class 
structure of GHG emissions. 
 
2.1 National economic interests: the productive structure of the economy and the relative 
position in global GHG chains 
We assume the countries to adopt a stance in IEA that reflects their national economic 
interests, the latter shaping to a large extent their carbon volontarism. This is consistent with 
game theory and IPE neorealism: translated into those approaches, protecting their national 
economic interest is a way for the countries to maximize their payoff function in the 
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bargaining process. This section thus focuses on the strategic underpinnings of carbon 
voluntarism. 
2.1.1 The productive structure of the economy and tertiarization 
The productive structure of the economy refers to the relative importance of the primary, the 
secondary and the tertiary sectors: The first is mainly composed of agriculture, extractive and 
energy activities, the second of manufacturing and construction, and the third of services. An 
effect posited by the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature is that progress in 
economic development and increasing income go together with a shift in the productive 
structure of the economy towards the tertiary sector. This in turn is assumed to have beneficial 
effects on environmental degradation, because services require less materials and less waste. 
However, this effect may be limited in two ways: first, consumption structures still involve 
material-intensive consumption goods at high income levels and high income economies 
haven’t reduced their material basis despite their tendency towards tertiarization (Martinez-
Alier et al., 2010) as the production of services requires high quantities of material inputs (for 
instance the internet industry needs computers and physical networks to operate). Second, the 
increase in environmental quality can be partly an illusion because pollution-intensive 
industries may have simply relocated elsewhere (Van Alstine and Neumayer, 2008). 
Nevertheless, politically the growth of the tertiary sector can play a useful role towards 
ambitious climate policies because economic activities, and so the fiscal base of the 
government, are less directly linked to GHG emissions. Therefore, the governments face less 
risks of impacting their fiscal base if they implement ambitious climate policies. 
2.1.2 The relative position in global GHG chains and GHG offshoring: compossibility at 
work 
The relative position in global GHG chains illustrates that some countries pollute for others. A 
substantial part of consumption in high-income countries is imported, which induces 
emissions abroad and thus embodied GHG in international trade (Peters et al., 2012; Peters et 
al., 2011). This process can be qualified as GHG offshoring for GHG importing countries and 
as carbon “inshoring” for GHG exporting countries. In illustrating the relative position in 
global GHG chains, GHG off/in-shoring reflects the extent to which GHG-intensive activities 
underlie the fiscal base of the government, together with the productive structure of the 
economy. To account for GHG off/in-shoring, we consider as a proxy whether a country is net 
importer or net exporter of CO2. The CO2 balance of each country is calculated using 
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consumption and production-based CO2 emissions. Consumption-based CO2 emissions are 
the total emissions induced by the country i final consumption net of domestic emissions 
induced by final consumption abroad (Peters, 2008):  
ܥܱ2௖௢௡௦௨௠௣௧௜௢௡௜ ൌ ܥܱ2௣௥௢ௗ௨௖௧௜௢௡௜ െ ܥܱ2௘௠௕௢ௗ௜௘ௗ	௜௡	௘௫௣௢௥௧௦௜ ൅ ܥܱ2௘௠௕௢ௗ௜௘ௗ	௜௡	௜௠௣௢௥௧௦௜  
Production-based emissions are emissions emitted in the country i for a given period. The 
CO2 balance is therefore simply equal to consumption-based CO2 – production-based CO2, 
which gives us the total amount of CO2 embodied in net imports for one country. Net 
importers of CO2 are countries whose own final consumption induces more CO2 than they 
emit domestically; net exporters are countries whose own final consumption induces less CO2 
than they emit domestically. Net CO2 importers are the countries at the end of global CO2 
chains, those that have offshored their CO2 emissions to the greatest extent. Net CO2 
exporters are the countries at the beginning of global CO2 chains, those who kept their 
emissions inshore.  
The figures contained in Table 1 confirm that, for our sample, the most ambitious countries 
regarding CO2 mitigation objectives tend also to be the countries that are net CO2 importers 
through embodied CO2 in international trade. 
 
  
Average GHG mitigation 
objectives by 2030 for COP21 
in % of 1990 emissions 
Net CO2 importers in 2013 6 
Net CO2 exporters in 2013 99 
 
Table 1. Average GHG mitigation objectives declared to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change for the COP21. Sources: calculus from the author, UNFCC (INDCs), Climate Action 
Tracker, Eora I/O Database. 
 
In average, countries that are net CO2 importers in 2013 expect an increase in their GHG 
emissions of 6 % of their 1990 emissions level by 2030. By comparison, countries that are net 
CO2 exporters in 2013 expect an average increase in their GHG emissions of 99% of their 
1990 emissions level by 2030. Here we must thus go beyond methodological nationalism 
(Peck and Theodore, 2007) in emphasizing the importance of compossibility in carbon 
voluntarism: Compossibility is understood in the sense of Jessop (2014, p. 54) as “the 
structural coupling, co-evolution and mutual complementarities-exclusivities and their impact 
on differential accumulation at a world scale”. Capital accumulation at the world scale by 
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2030 will likely be based on a global increase of GHG emissions. Their distribution illustrates 
both mutual complementarities amongst countries within global GHG chains and co-evolution 
in their GHG emissions: The lowering of carbon emissions in some parts of the world will 
have as a counterpart an increase in carbon emissions elsewhere. In other terms it means that 
within global capitalism carbon voluntarism is exclusive: More ecological national 
accumulation regimes somewhere are possible because less ecological national accumulation 
regimes remain elsewhere that provide the former with a substantial part of their final 
consumption. Therefore, high and low ambitions of emissions mitigation cannot be 
comprehended separately within global capitalism because of the intertwining of national 
accumulation regimes. As a function of the relative positions in global GHG chains, GHG 
mitigation objectives are thus a product of compossibility. It should be clear then that even if 
we regrouped the productive structure of the countries and their relative position in global 
GHG chains under the label of national economic interests, it also reflects the influence of 
external factors on a country’s carbon voluntarism. 
 
2.2 National ecological preferences: Income, capitalist development and the political 
demand for environmental policies 
Beyond strategic factors such as the national economic interests and their interconnection in 
global capitalism, the political basis of climate policies are also shaped by the national 
ecological preferences. We draw on the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) narrative and 
on the neorealist approach to discuss the socio-political determinants of carbon voluntarism. 
2.2.1 Income, capitalist development and the Environmental Kuznets Curve narrative 
The impact of income and of development levels on the environment has been classically 
investigated through the literature on the EKC. Although this relation was never assessed at a 
macroeconomic level for all kinds of environmental concerns - in particular it was not firmly 
assessed in the case of CO2 emissions (Stern, 2004), but some recent results provide evidence 
of an EKC for CO2 (Apergis, 2016) - this does not mean that the levels of income and 
development do not play a role in the determination of carbon voluntarism. Following the 
literature on the EKC, we assume they may be related in three main ways. 
First, on a microeconomic scale, a usual assumption is that environmental quality is a luxury 
good. The demand for environmental quality has a positive income elasticity so citizens will 
get more concerned by ecological matters once they reach a living standard threshold (Berthe 
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and Élie, 2015; Van Alstine and Neumayer, 2008). This assumption entails a notion of 
subordination of needs and non-substitutability, which makes it impossible to represent in a 
neoclassical framework within the usual utility function. In terms of the post-Keynesian 
choice theory it can be understood as lexicographic preferences embodied in a vector of 
characteristics: Households attempt at satisfying the nth characteristic when the nth-1 is already 
fulfilled (Lavoie, 2014). Lexicographic preferences have been shown to be particularly 
relevant in understanding environmental choices of individuals (Gowdy and Mayumi, 2001; 
van den Bergh et al., 2000). In literary terms, the EKC can be dubbed as a Woody Allen 
Effect: When people have solved the materialist question, then they can afford spending a 
substantial part of their life asking themselves existential questions about life, love and the 
kind of society they would like to live in, including ecological questions, and trying to shape 
their life in accordance. From this standpoint, it may explain why Woody Allen’s movies 
often take place in rather bourgeois environments. Such an effect has been investigated in the 
field of ecological economics in Scruggs (1998). A microeconomic or local EKC might then 
occur if people can afford to adapt their life to their belief according to a set of lexicographic 
preferences encompassing ecological issues. Empirical results have suggested the occurrence 
of an EKC for some local pollutants (Dinda, 2004).  
However, the social determinism of the EKC is problematic: It is clearly not because one 
becomes wealthier that one will naturally become more virtuous from an ecological 
standpoint. Regarding GHG, empirical evidences show that wealthier people are also those 
that have the largest emissions, even though some results also show that the GHG intensity of 
consumption is negatively correlated with the level of income (Berthe and Élie, 2015; 
Lenglart et al., 2010; Chancel and Piketty, 2015). This could indicate that, for a given living 
standard, wealthier households may try to reduce their ecological impact in consuming more 
ecological products, which is consistent with the lexicographic nature of environmental 
preferences.  
Another limit to the EKC is that, once understood as a mechanical relation between income 
and ecological virtue, it cannot account for situations where the surrounding natural 
environment is directly at stake for survival, an important matter in the environmentalism of 
the poor and environmental justice movements (Martinez-Alier, 2014). In this case, the trade-
off between income and ecology may not be possible and the above lexicographic ordering 
may be questionable, or may even be reversed: The preservation of nature may come first, and 
an increase in income may be aimed for if, and only if, preservation of nature is achieved. 
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When taken at the household level, the level of income may thus be considered a factor of the 
political demand for environmental quality, although it cannot obviously be considered to be 
the sole factor. 
Secondly, the income and development factor may play a role both at the firm and the 
macroeconomic levels, through the spreading of innovations increasing productivity and 
allowing for improvements in the use of resources and production of waste. The long-term 
relationship linking GDP growth and technology is a well-known theoretical and empirical 
fact known as the Kaldor-Verdoorn’s Law: As aggregate demand increases so do incentives to 
innovate (Kaldor, 1975; Knell, 2004; Angeriz et al., 2009; Millemaci and Ofria, 2014). Even 
though the environmental effect of technology is ambiguous because of potential Jevons 
effects – that is the increase in consumption by the means of energy savings (Van Alstine and 
Neumayer, 2008), capitalist development may then be considered a proxy for the 
technological ability to reduce GHG emissions and therefore a determinant of carbon 
voluntarism. 
Finally, at the macro level, economy-wide public policies might be of greater importance for 
determining the income/development-environment nexus than the sum of individual will and 
actions from households and firms. From this perspective, we expect wealthier countries to 
have more abilities in implementing environmental policies than poorer ones because they 
simply have more technological and financial wherewithal for doing so. Indeed, some INDCs 
of low and middle-income countries explicitly integrate financial transfers in order to 
implement emissions reduction policies or to raise their GHG mitigation objectives (see 
Mexico or Gabon for instance) and a crucial issue at the COP21 was financial commitments 
from high income countries towards middle and low income countries. 
To sum up, we assume income and capitalist development to be important determinants for 
carbon voluntarism because of a Woody Allen effect on households’ preferences, because of 
the broadening of technological possibilities and because of an increase in financial means to 
implement public policies aimed at emissions mitigation. 
2.2.2 The political demand for the environment as the social basis of environmental policies 
Environmental issues and benefits might not be evenly distributed socially and 
geographically, so they might not affect social classes in the same way or similar intensity. 
Therefore different classes may have conflicting interests regarding environmental 
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regulations. As the neorealist 1  approach shows, social expectations are the product of 
conflicting ideologies translated into political demands (Amable and Palombarini, 2008; 
Guillaud and Palombarini, 2006). Therefore, with the degradation of the environmental 
conditions of production, one may analyse the emergence of environmentalism as a mean to 
shift the political mediation between conflicting interests towards new institutions, i.e., more 
severe environmental regulations. Climate policy may thus be seen as part of a compromise 
between antagonistic classes. It embodies in new institutions, here environmental regulations 
such as emissions mitigation, to ensure the adequate reproduction of the environmental 
conditions of production. As Elie et al. (2012) show, environmental regulations vary across 
models of capitalism and do not emerge in a historical vacuum: They illustrate this process of 
institutionalisation of environmentalism. O’Connor (2008) points out the role of 
environmentalism in the process leading to new institutional compromises to regulate 
capitalism (p. 27): 
 
“As labor exploitation (…) engendered a labor movement which during particular times and places 
turned itself into a "social barrier" to capital, nature exploitation (…) engenders an environmental 
movement (…) which may also constitute a "social barrier" to capital.” 
 
In the Neorealist framework, environmental policies are new institutions emerging as a 
compromise between antagonistic classes forming a dominant social bloc on ecological 
issues. As part of the socio-political basis of such policies, the political demand for the 
environment might be a key determinant of carbon voluntarism. It also captures the influence 
of non-governmental organizations acting at the supranational level, although we encompass 
the political demand for the environment into the national ecological preferences categories. 
The more these organizations are supported in every country, the more influential they can be 
both nationally and internationally. 
 
2.3 Class dynamics: financialization and the class structure of emissions 
Financialization refers to the transformations in the nature of capital accumulation since the 
end of the Fordist regime of accumulation (Boyer, 2000). Drawing on the literature, we define 
financialization as the process of the emergence of finance as a major sector of the economy 
                                                 
1 The neorealist approach of Amable and Palombarini is not to be confused with the neorealist approach in 
International Political Economy mentioned in the introduction. Both terms “neorealist” refer to different fields. 
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and as the governing principle of nonfinancial corporations’ management (Epstein, 2005; 
Krippner, 2005; van der Zwan, 2014). This is a synthetic definition that has no pretention to 
be exhaustive. Financialization is considered as a major factor of the shift in the relations 
between labour and capital that has occurred in the past 40 years (Duménil and Lévy, 2012). 
In this work, we will mostly focus on the second part of the definition that is the 
financialization of firm management, even though the rise of finance as a sector is taken into 
account through the productive structure of the economy. To distinguish from sectorial 
financialization, we refer to the financialization of firm management as financial 
accumulation on the one hand – because it has led to the primacy of financial capital over 
productive capital – and functional financialization on the other hand – because it has shifted 
the functional income distribution between labour and capital. The shift in class dynamics 
entailed by the financialization process produces particular configurations of the class 
structure of GHG emissions that can have political consequences for climate policies. 
2.3.1 The financial turn of accumulation: The crowding-out of productive investment and 
innovation 
Financial accumulation refers to the decrease in productive investment and to the increase in 
financial investment, stock buybacks and distributed profits through dividends and interest. At 
the macroeconomic level, several authors established a negative relationship between 
financialization, investment and capital accumulation in high income countries 
(Stockhammer, 2004, 2006, 2010; Cordonnier, 2006; Husson, 2010). At the firm level, the 
literature also show compelling evidences of a shift from the “retain and reinvest” model to 
the “downsize and distribute” model of firm management leading to a crowding-out of 
productive investment and innovation (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Orhangazi, 2008; 
Clévenot et al., 2010; Lazonick, 2010; Seo et al., 2012). 
The trade-off between financial requirements and capital accumulation illustrate a reluctance 
towards long-term investment and innovation that might prove a brake towards an ambitious 
climate policy on four grounds: firstly, in limiting countries’ ability to renew their productive 
structure, i.e. to shift towards less polluting and more efficient production processes because 
of a lack of investment and innovation; secondly, because offshoring may occur to increase 
financial profitability; thirdly, because faced with financialization, governments may therefore 
limit their emissions reduction ambitions to safeguard their fiscal base; and last but not least, 
because less productive investment means less activity and so less wages. Aggregate demand 
is then decreased, weakening the Kaldor-Verdoorn relationship between growth and 
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innovation and therefore the ability to improve production processes towards less GHG 
emissions as economic development occurs. 
2.3.2 The decreasing labour share and the class structure of emissions 
Alongside capital accumulation, the labour share in income distribution has also declined as a 
result of financialization, resulting in a shift in the wage-labour nexus (Boyer, 2000). A 
number of studies using diverse measures of financialization found an inverse relationship 
with the labour share for an extensive number of countries (Jayadev, 2007; Jayadev and 
Epstein, 2007; Dünhaupt, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Stockhammer, 2012; Husson, 2010; 
Köhler et al., 2015).  
The increasing pressure over the labour share might be a brake towards ambitious climate 
policies. In case of tighter GHG mitigation regulations, firms might have to invest in 
productive capital and innovation to decrease their emissions. However, faced with financial 
pressures, firms can hardly decrease the share of income dedicated to meeting current 
standards on returns on investment. In other words, for a given profit, in finance-led 
capitalism firms cannot decrease the profit share that goes to financial capital. In order to 
invest to comply with environmental regulations, firms might then decrease employment or 
wages and so the labour share. Functional financialization might then shape carbon 
voluntarism through four channels: First, governments might be reluctant to pursue ambitious 
climate policies to avoid increasing the pressure on the labour share and so on their fiscal base 
if firms were to devote an increased share of income to emissions mitigation. Second, a 
decreasing labour share may have negative impacts if understood in terms of the EKC, 
because it will prevent households from reaching the threshold at which they will express or 
implement ecological preferences. Third, in terms of the Kaldor-Verdoorn relationship, a 
decreasing labour share might be a factor of lower economic activity and so of incentive to 
innovate. Fourthly, as a factor of widening inequalities between workers and capital owners 
and between the top management and other categories of workers (Dünhaupt, 2011), the 
decreasing labour share also affects the class structure of GHG emissions. As said earlier, the 
wealthiest people are the most emitting. In case of a highly unequal class structure of 
emissions, carbon voluntarism might be faced with two political complementary mechanisms: 
The dominant class will defend its GHG-intensive lifestyle while the dominated class might 
refuse to mitigate its emissions since they are lower, considering that desires and preferences 
often polarize around the dominant way of life (Wisman, 2011; Veblen, 1979). Therefore, a 
highly unequal class structure of emissions might prevent the formation of a dominant social 
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bloc supporting climate policies because the dominant way of life may be seen as a power to 
achieve, “which is durably inscribed in the bodies of the dominated, in the form of schemes of 
perception and dispositions (to respect, admire, love, etc.), in other words, beliefs which make 
one sensitive to certain public manifestations, such as public representations of power” 
(Bourdieu, 2000, p. 171).  
 
 
Figure 1. The underpinnings of carbon voluntarism and their effects. 
Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical links between its assumed underpinnings and carbon 
voluntarism. Drawing on carbon voluntarism understood as the product of all these factors 
and their interactions, we attempt at delineating a typology of countries from this perspective. 
The next part will present our sample of countries and the data used to proceed to our 
statistical analysis. 
3 Empirical methodology 
This section presents in turn the sample and data used and the statistical methods. We used 
two exploratory statistical techniques. First, we applied a principal components analysis 
(PCA) to our economic and socio-political variables. Second we proceeded to a mixed 
hierarchical and K-mean clustering to obtain a typology of the countries that we compared 
with their carbon voluntarism. 
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3.1 Sample and data 
Our sample is made of 37 OECD and BRICS countries.2 These countries account for about 
80% of world GDP, 60% of the world population and 70% of global GHG emissions and are 
therefore the main stakeholders in climate negotiations. Fourteen variables are included, 
thirteen of which are used for the statistical analysis. Table 2 presents the data, their meaning 
and their sources3.  
Underpinnings Variable Meaning Source 
Carbon voluntarism COP21 GHG reduction objective for COP21 
INDCs; Climate Action Tracker; emissions data 
from UNFCC, Edgar v4.2 FT2012 and Eurostat; 
calculations from the author 
Productive structure 
PrimAgri Primary sector, agriculture: share in gross value added (NACE: A) 
OECDStat; World Development Indicators 
PrimIndus 
Primary sector, extractive and energy activities: 
share in gross value added (NACE: B to E 
except C) 
SecManuf Secondary sector, manufacturing: share in gross value added (NACE: C) 
SecConst Secondary sector, construction: share in gross value added (NACE: F) 
Ter_Serv 
Tertiary sector, non-FIRE activities: share in 
gross value added (NACE: G to U except K and 
L) 
Ter_FIRE 
Tertiary sector, financial, insurance and real 
estate activities: share in gross value added 
(NACE: K and L) 
Income and 
development GDPCap 2015 GDP per capita in 2014 US$ Total Economy Database 
Relative position in 
global GHG chains EmbCO2 
2013 share of net embodied CO2 in imports 
(exports) 
Eora Input-Ouput Database v. 199.82 (Lenzen et 
al., 2013) 
Political demand for 
the environment 
IUCN Number of org. belonging to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature per 
millions of people and financial supporters of 
Greenpeace in % of population 
IUCN, World Development Indicators 
(population) 
GreenP Greenpeace national websites and annual reports and World Development Indicators (population) 
Class structure of 
emissions ClassGHG Inter-decile ratio of emissions Chancel and Piketty (2015), OECDStat 
Financialization 
FinIndex Share of not-reinvested profit in % of GDP. OECDStat and Ameco 
WShare Wage share at factor cost 
Table 2. Variables and sources. 
We measure carbon voluntarism as the mitigation objectives declared for the COP21: We 
assume the COP21 contribution of a country to be a synthetic indicator of its carbon 
voluntarism. For countries with a base year other than 1990 or basing their mitigation 
objective relatively to a business-as-usual scenario, 1990 equivalencies were either taken from 
                                                 
2 . Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
3 For a matter of space, the values are given in the supplementary material. 
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the Climate Action Tracker website4 (CAT) or computed by the author using the following 
formulae: 
ሾቀܧ௕௔௦௘	௬௘௔௥௜ െ ߮ா್ೌೞ೐	೤೐ೌೝ௜ ൈ ܧ௕௔௦௘	௬௘௔௥௜ ቁ െ	ܧଵଽଽ଴௜ ሿ
ܧଵଽଽ଴௜ ൈ 100 
With ܧଵଽଽ଴௜ 	emissions of country i in 1990, ܧ௕௔௦௘	௬௘௔௥௜ 	the emissions of country i in the base 
year and ߮ா್ೌೞ೐	೤೐ೌೝ௜ 	country’s i percentage of base year emissions mitigation as declared for 
the COP21. Equivalencies in absolute emissions when INDCs were declared in GHG intensity 
of GDP were taken from CAT or calculated by the author. Equivalencies in emissions 
excluding Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) when INDCs were declared 
including LULUCF were taken from Climate Action Tracker. The reason to exclude 
LULUCF is that it allows for concentrating on emissions from industrial sources and energy 
combustion, avoiding the bias introduced by CO2 capture of forests and plants, which may act 
as an offsetting mechanism. Therefore, it better reflects real mitigation. Some particular cases 
should be noted. First, the European Union submitted a collective INDC with an overall 
objective of a 40% decrease in emissions by 2030 compared to 1990. The European 
Commission later released national emissions target for each EU member for the sectors not 
included in the EU Emissions Trading System (EUETS): agriculture, construction, waste 
management, transportation, CO2 capture and storage as well as LULUCF. At the EU level, 
these sectors are to reduce their total emissions by 30% relative to 2005 (European 
Commission, 2016)5. The EU ETS scheme includes 
“heavy energy-using installations consisting of power stations and other combustion plants with ≥ 20MW 
thermal rated input (except hazardous or municipal waste installations), oil refineries, coke ovens, iron 
and steel, cement clinker, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board, aluminium, 
petrochemicals, ammonia, nitric, adipic and glyoxylic acid production, CO2 capture, transport in 
pipelines and geological storage of CO2. The aviation scope of the EU ETS is limited to flights within the 
EEA until 2016 (...).” (European Commission, n.d., p. 20) 
The EU mitigation objective for the ETS sectors is 43% by 2030 compared to 2005. We 
computed a value for the COP21 variable combining both the national objectives for the non-
ETS sectors and the EU objective for the ETS sectors6. The individual objectives regarding 
                                                 
4 http://climateactiontracker.org/, accessed August 3, 2016. 
5 The national emissions targets are propositions and will be subject to negotiations. Moreover, they include the 
United Kingdom and are also subject to change because of the Brexit. 
6 See the supplementary material for the detailed calculation. 
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non-ETS sectors include LULUCF and no equivalency excluding LULUCF was available. 
However, the differentiation with the EU target for major industrial and energy sectors 
covered by the ETS decreases the impact of including LULUCF. Second, for the USA, the 
INDC stated an objective of 28% mitigation including LULUCF by 2025 compared to 2005, 
while the other INDCs stated objective by 2030. We took the equivalency excluding 
LULUCF provided by CAT and computed the average annual mitigation rate from 2005 to 
2025. We assumed this rate would hold for the period 2025-2030 and computed the expected 
level of emissions excluding LULUCF in 2030. We then computed the equivalency in terms 
of 1990 emissions.  Third, for New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland, the value for COP21 
includes LULUCF because no equivalency excluding LULUCF was available. Ways of 
accounting for LULUCF may also differ. Fourthly, a few countries such as New Zealand and 
Switzerland aim at including offsetting of emissions abroad through tools such as the Clean 
Development Mechanism that allows to earn emissions credits by reducing or avoiding 
emissions in developing countries. In itself, the inclusion of such a mechanism in the INDC 
indicates a will to reduce the impact of climate policies on the domestic economy and thus of 
a lower carbon voluntarism than the value of COP21 may suggest. Therefore, the COP21 
variable is not perfectly homogenous amongst the countries because of accounting 
differences. If this is clearly a difficulty for comparability to bear in mind, it should however 
be noted that for all countries the non-LULUCF sectors and the domestic measures to be 
implemented play the major role and that for the countries in which LULUCF is more likely 
to play an important role, such as Brazil and Russia, equivalencies excluding LULUCF were 
available. For these reasons, we will nonetheless proceed to comparisons amongst countries 
or group of countries. For the various calculations regarding the levels of carbon voluntarism 
we took emissions data from the UNFCC whenever possible, from the Edgar database 
otherwise: Comparisons of common available years from the two sources shown data 
consistency. The COP21 variable is not part of the PCA and the clustering: We performed the 
analysis upon the underpinnings assumed to produce carbon voluntarism. Then we compared 
the typology obtained to carbon voluntarism to see if it matches our theoretical reasoning.  
The productive structure is captured through the respective shares of the primary, the 
secondary and the tertiary sectors, each of them being split in two activities or group of 
activities to refine the analysis. 2015 values were taken except for Australia, Ireland, Israel, 
Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, Turkey, United States (2014), China (2013), 
New Zealand (2012), Brazil (2011) and India (2009). For South Africa and Russia, ISIC 
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revision 3 data were taken because of missing data in revision 4. For these countries, the FIRE 
sector may therefore be overestimated because it is merged with other activities. For China, 
OECD and World Bank data were combined to isolate manufacturing. Income and capitalist 
development are represented by the GDP per capita for 2015. The relative position in global 
GHG chains is approximated by the 2013 share of CO2 emissions embodied in imports net of 
embodied CO2 emissions in exports over the period. The political demand for the 
environment is proxied through two variables: The number of governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations members of the IUCN per millions of people up to date as of 
August 2015 and the number of financial supporters of Greenpeace as a percentage of the 
population for the most recent year available. Three countries, Estonia, Ireland and Portugal 
have no local Greenpeace organization and have therefore a value of 0 for the variable. While 
it may induce a bias in the analysis, the absence of such an important environmental NGO 
may also mean something regarding the local political demand for environment. The class 
structure of emissions is estimated through the ratio of the emissions of the 9th decile of 
income distribution to the emissions of the 1st decile of income distribution for 2013, except 
for Australia (2003), New Zealand (1998) and Switzerland (D9/D2 ratio). Data were missing 
for Chile: the value for the D9/D1 income ratio from OECDStat was chosen as a proxy, since 
the D9/D1 emissions ratio and the D9/D1 income ratio appeared very close for the whole 
sample. Finally, financialization is composed of two variables: FinIndex proxies financial 
accumulation as the difference between the gross margin rate and the gross fixed capital 
formation rate, or, in other terms, the share of profit in GDP that is not reinvested. 2014 
values were taken except for Australia, Chile, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Russia, 
South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, United States (2013), China, Israel (2012), India 
(2009) and Turkey (2006). Functional financialization is proxied by the adjusted wage share at 
factor cost from Ameco. For BRICS countries and Israel, data were taken from OECDStat 
and the wage share was computed as ௐ௒ି் ൈ 100 with W the compensation of employees, Y the 
GDP and T the taxes and subsidies on production and imports, so to have the wage share at 
factor cost. 2015 values were taken except for Australia, New Zealand (2014), Chile, Russia, 
South Korea, South Africa (2013), China, Israel, Mexico, (2012), India (2009) and Turkey 
(2006). Here one should note that a higher wage share means a lower functional 
financialization. 
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3.2 Principal Components Analysis 
PCA is an exploratory statistical method that allows for synthesising a set of multiple 
variables into a limited number of orthogonal components: the factor axes. Each component 
synthesizes a decreasing but supplementary fraction of the total variance (inertia) in the 
variables. The first axis synthesizes the biggest part of the inertia, the second axis synthesizes 
an additional but smaller part of the inertia and so on: The axes are additive to one another 
because they are completely uncorrelated (Roux, 2014; Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006). To 
choose the number of axes to keep we followed the Keiser criterion: We kept the axes with an 
eigenvalue greater than the average. Since we performed a normalized PCA, the sum of 
eigenvalues is equal to the number of the active variables and so the average eigenvalue is 1. 
Axes 1 to 5 fulfil the Keiser criterion7. Proceeding first to a PCA produces a more robust 
clustering with more stable clusters since the noise has been taken out through the removal of 
the residual axes (Husson et al., 2010).  
3.3 Clustering 
We then proceeded to a mixed method of hierarchical and partitioning clustering upon the 
five synthetic variables kept in the PCA. The hierarchical ascendant clustering determined the 
number of classes to keep according to the factor axes so to avoid choosing a number of 
classes ex ante and arbitrarily. To choose the number of classes to keep, we relied on several 
criteria: the optimal number of clusters suggested by the algorithm8; the inertia gain of 
partitioning to another cluster; the length of the links on the diagram and the extent to which 
each class is interpretable (Husson et al., 2010). Given these criteria, we kept four clusters. 
Consolidating the clusters using K-means partitioning reduces the inertia inside each cluster, 
giving more homogeneous clusters and improving the partition. Table 3 shows the results of 
the clustering9. 
                                                 
7 The detailed results for the PCA are given in the supplementary material. 
8 The statistical analysis was performed using the FactoMineR package of R. 
9 As explained, the clustering was performed of the synthetic axes obtained from the PCA and not on the raw 
variables. However, it is more relevant to come back to the variables for the analysis. The results for the clusters 
in terms of the axes are presented in the supplementary material. 
18 
 
Cluster Countries Variables COP21 (%) PrimAgri(%) 
PrimIndus 
(%) 
SecManuf 
(%) 
SecConst
(%) 
Ter_Serv  
(%) 
Ter_FIRE 
(%) GDPCap
EmbCO2
(%) IUCN 
GreenP
(%) 
FinIndex
(%) 
WShare
(%) ClassGHG 
1 
Brazil, Chile, 
China, India, 
Mexico, Poland, 
Slovakia, Turkey 
Mean 171 6,79 6,94 17,96 7,10 46,13 12,38 18 568 7,52 0,12 0,06 27,70 45 7,74 
St. dev. 175 4,67 3,08 5,33 0,95 7,04 3,64 6 955 17,90 0,07 0,05 15,69 8,31 3,40 
2 
Australia, 
Canada, 
Norway, Russia, 
South Africa 
Mean -6 2,46 14,12 10,86 6,48 48,40 18,40 40 328 -0,33 0,60 0,22 16,47 59 6,27 
St. dev. 20 0,97 5,68 3,28 1,55 3,61 3,50 18 878 21,27 0,40 0,22 4,77 4,52 2,56 
3 
Austria, Czech 
Rep., Estonia, 
Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, 
Portugal, 
Slovenia, South 
Korea, Spain, 
UK, US 
Mean -15 2,10 3,61 17,61 4,93 55,06 16,25 36 712 16,83 0,54 0,19 23,05 60 4,75 
St. dev. 46 1,03 0,96 5,63 1,03 3,88 3,23 8 610 13,42 0,33 0,31 7,21 6,09 1,72 
4 
Belgium, 
Denmark, 
Finland, France, 
Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Sweden, 
Switzerland 
Mean -40 2,08 3,56 14,04 5,38 59,25 15,38 45 684 27,00 1,58 1,05 15,84 65 3,84 
St. dev. 13 1,64 1,12 2,56 0,58 4,41 2,91 6 225 20,16 0,53 0,70 4,23 4,05 0,85 
Overall mean 21 3,16 5,74 16,00 5,71 53,14 15,51 35 218 14,70 0,68 0,35 21,61 57,70 5,41 
Overall standard dev. 118 3,09 4,46 5,39 1,36 6,82 3,79 13 681 19,30 0,62 0,54 10,12 9,10 2,61 
 Table 3. The classes obtained from the clustering, the average values and standard deviations of the variables for each category and the overall sample, and the 
average carbon voluntarisms for each class. Values for characterizing variables of each class are in bold. Parangons are in bold and most distinct countries in italic. 
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For each cluster, the parangon (the closest country to the barycentre of a cluster) is in bold 
and the most distinct country (the furthest country from the barycentre of the other clusters) is 
in italic. The significant variables to characterize a cluster have their values in bold for the 
corresponding cluster. The significance is given by the test-values reported in the appendix. 
4 Results 
A first thought is that all the clusters are rather heterogeneous in terms of carbon voluntarism, 
as shown by the standard deviations of COP21. Indeed, ultimately each country has its own 
stance towards carbon voluntarism so clustering involves necessarily some arbitrariness and 
nuances. The clusters include at least one country that appears at odds with their average 
carbon voluntarism: Poland and Slovakia in cluster 1, Norway in cluster 2, Israel, Portugal, 
South Korea and Spain in cluster 3 and New Zealand in cluster 4. However, this does not 
mean that our typology is inconsistent: Our results exhibit a clear trend from very low to 
average carbon voluntarism10 rather in line with our theoretical premises. 
Cluster 1 is composed of emerging countries as well as Poland and Slovakia and has the 
lowest average carbon voluntarism. The primary sector is at the core of the countries’ national 
economic interests as shown by the share of agriculture in the gross value added, the highest 
of all the clusters, and the share of the extractive and energy activities, the second highest. 
This cluster has also the highest share of manufacturing and the lowest share of the tertiary 
sector. The average productive structure of this cluster as well as the low share of net 
embodied CO2 in imports indicates that these countries tend to be at the beginning of global 
GHG chains. The cluster is also characterized by the weakest ecological preferences as shown 
by the values of IUCN and GreenP. Strong internal class dynamics are at work: it has the 
highest FinIndex value and the lowest wage share and the class structure of emissions is the 
most unequal. Cluster 2 encompasses both emerging and high income countries strongly 
relying on the primary sector, in particular extractive and energy activities and is the second 
lowest is terms of carbon voluntarism. Similarly to cluster 1, these countries can therefore be 
considered at the beginning of global GHG chains, as exemplified by the cluster’s negative 
share of net embodied CO2, which means that in average the countries of cluster 2 are net 
exporters of GHG. Their class structure of emissions is the second most unequal after cluster 
1. Cluster 3 is composed for more than half of Southern, Central and Eastern European 
                                                 
10 See table 5 and supplementary material for details on the ranking of carbon voluntarisms from very low to 
high. 
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countries, and has a low carbon voluntarism depending on the assumption regarding EU 
members’ individual objectives. These countries are characterized by a strong secondary 
sector, especially manufacturing activities, as opposed to their primary sector, while they also 
appear strongly relying on their tertiary sector. Cluster 3 has an average level of political 
demand for the environment similar to cluster 2. Its class structure of emissions is however 
more equal. Cluster 4 is made of central and Northern European countries as well as New 
Zealand. These countries have a prominent tertiary sector. They are at the end of global GHG 
chains as shown by their high share of net embodied CO2 in imports. In average, they also 
have the lowest FinIndex values and the highest wage share. Cluster 4 also exhibits the most 
equal class structure of emissions and is characterized by the strongest political demand for 
the environment. 
5 Discussion 
Based on our results, table 5 synthezises the varieties of carbon voluntarism from very low to 
average according to a benchmark based upon the last report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014). 
 
Cluster 
IPCC benchmark 
mitigation clusters 
average 
(%) 
COP21 (%) 
Varieties of carbon voluntarism 
Ranking Summary 
1 3 171 Very Low 
Emerging countries with 
prominent primary and 
secondary sectors, a lower 
political demand for the 
environment, a higher 
financialization and an unequal 
class structure of emissions 
2 -42 -6 
Low 
High income and emerging 
countries net exporters of GHG 
with important extractive and 
energy activities, and an 
unequal class structure of 
emissions. 
3 -51 -15 
High income countries with 
strong secondary and tertiary 
sectors. 
4 -55 -40 High 
High income countries with a 
prominent tertiary sector, a 
higher share of imported GHG, 
a lower financialization, a more 
equal class structure of 
emissions and a higher political 
demand for the environment. 
Table 5. IPCC scenario RCP 2.6 (66-100% chance to limit climate change to 2 degrees Celsius) was used 
as a benchmark (IPCC, 2014). Carbon voluntarisms are ranked from very low to high according to the 
following rules: very low means an increase in GHG emissions by 2030; low means a mitigation of less than 
half the benchmark rate; average means a mitigation from half to two thirds of the benchmark rate; high 
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means a mitigation from two thirds of the benchmark rate onwards. See appendix 6 in the supplementary 
material for computation details. 
A general thought arising from these results is that explaining carbon voluntarism entirely by 
the levels of income and development of a country is insufficient. Even though income, 
capitalist development and the productive structure are linked to each other, we can see that 
the latter may have an impact on its own with cluster 2, which is composed of high income 
and emerging countries that rely strongly on the primary sector and that are not so carbon 
voluntary despite an average value of GDPCap higher than for cluster 3. As we assumed 
theoretically, countries adopt a stance towards GHG mitigation that is consistent with their 
fiscal base. Indeed, carbon voluntarism follows national economic interests: the more the 
countries rely on the primary sector, the less they are carbon voluntary. This result may help 
shedding light on the uncertainty about an EKC for global pollutants: income and capitalist 
development do not determine alone a linear path towards more environmental policies. The 
underlying structure of the economy is to be taken into account to understand this path. This 
should also cause us to look for a more nuanced view than the usual representation of climate 
policies as developed versus developing countries issues. That representation is not false as 
our results show, but it oversimplifies the possible explanations of a country carbon 
voluntarism: Both developed and developing countries are neither homogenous amongst each 
other nor are they a homogenous body deprived of its own internal dynamics. We do not say 
that the levels of income and capitalist development play no role: As we can see, there is a 
clear tendency of richer nations to be more carbon voluntary. However, this last observation is 
tamed by the relative position of countries in global GHG chains. Except for the high income 
countries of cluster 2, the richest countries are at the end of these chains, with the highest 
share of net embodied GHG in their imports, or, in other terms, with the highest GHG 
offshoring, as shown by the values of EmbCO2. This result shows that compossibility within 
global capitalism plays an important role in the determination of carbon voluntarism: End-of-
pipe countries in global GHG chains rely on emerging countries for a substantial part of the 
emissions induced by their own consumption. At the global level, a core determinant of 
carbon voluntarism then appears to be the international division of labour, which closely 
overlaps with the international division of GHG emissions. 
Although the effect of the levels of income and development is to be nuanced, national 
ecological preferences appear to be an important factor. The higher the political demand for 
the environment, the higher carbon voluntarism as shown by the values of IUCN and GreenP 
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for clusters 1 that has the lowest political demand for the environment, and 4 that has the 
highest level. However, cluster 1 low political demand for the environment might also show 
that the kind of environmentalism that dominates in emerging countries is closer to the 
environmentalism of the poor or environmental justice movements (Martinez-Alier, 2002; 
2014) than to the environmentalism reflected by our variables, more akin to institutional 
environmentalism. The pregnancy of a strong political demand for the environment in the 
most carbon voluntary countries may also reflect the existence of a dominant bloc supporting 
institutional arrangements for a higher GHG mitigation. This explanation is consistent with 
what the analysis shows for the internal class dynamics. There is a tendency for a lower level 
of financialization, both for financial accumulation and functional financialization, to be 
associated with a higher carbon voluntarism. In line with our theoretical reasoning, it may be 
that the weaker the financialization process, the less the governments are reluctant to adopt 
climate policies because they fear less for their fiscal base to be negatively impacted and for 
the labour share to be put under more pressure. Moreover, a more equal class structure of 
GHG emissions goes with a higher carbon voluntarism: In the most equal countries in terms 
of GHG emissions, it may be easier to reach institutional compromise in favor of climate 
policies because GHG emissions are not the sole privilege of the dominant class. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we aimed at delineating a typology of carbon voluntarisms in terms of a set of 
economic and socio-political underpinnings to replace the analysis of climate policies in the 
historical context of contemporary globalized finance-led capitalism. Our results are in line 
with our theoretical reasoning. They show that if income and capitalist development play a 
substantial role in the stance of countries towards GHG mitigation, we need to look beyond to 
have a more nuanced and complex representation. National economic interests appear to play 
a key role: the productive structure of the economies and their relative position in global GHG 
chains are to be taken into account to understand the path towards carbon voluntarism. 
National ecological preferences are an important factor too, as shown by the strength of the 
political demand for the environment in the more ambitious countries for GHG mitigation. 
Results for internal class dynamics show that a more equal class structure of emissions acts in 
favor of carbon voluntarism while financialization appears to be a brake: the weaker 
functional financialization and financial accumulation, the greater carbon voluntarism.  
From these results, we delineated a typology of carbon voluntarisms from very low to 
average. The least carbon voluntary countries appear to be at the beginning of global GHG 
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chains, to rely heavily on the primary sector, to have a weaker political demand for the 
environment and to have a highly unequal class structure of emissions. The most carbon 
voluntary countries have a higher political demand for the environment, a more equal class 
structure of emissions, financialization is weaker, they rely to a great extent on the tertiary 
sector and they import an important part of their GHG emissions. As such, this article is then 
a complement to the existing game theory literature on international environmental 
agreements: Our results shed light on the underpinnings of the behaviors of the States in 
taking into account economic and socio-political factors whose combination and interactions 
produce carbon voluntarism. A promising research avenue would be to investigate further 
national institutional arrangements for the environment such as concrete measures of climate 
policies, the extent to which they reflect carbon voluntarism, and their correspondence to 
models of capitalism. 
In terms of public policy, a conclusion arising from this work is that global GHG chains 
should be taken into account in international climate negotiations and climate policies. A 
combination of measures would seem adequate: i.e. pushing for substantial financial and 
technological transfers to GHG exporting countries to assist them in shifting to a low-carbon 
economy or implementing carbon and kilometers taxes on imports to help relocating activities 
to more stringent countries in terms of GHG regulations. This work also shows that reducing 
inequalities and financialization dynamics might be sound policies to improve the social basis 
of climate policies. 
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Appendix 1. Raw data 
Country COP21 (%) 
PrimAgri 
(%) 
PrimIndus 
(%) 
SecManuf 
(%) 
SecConst 
(%) 
Ter_Serv 
(%) 
Ter_FIRE 
(%) 
GDPCap 
EmbCO2 
(%) 
IUCN 
GreenP 
(%) 
FinIndex 
(%) 
WShare 
(%) 
ClassGHG Cluster 
Brazil 112 5,1 7,00 13,90 6,3 53 15 14 635 12,31 0,10 0,02 21,09 50,29 14,42 1 
Chile 222 3,5 13,80 11,00 7,8 43 5 23 794 1,74 0,17 0,04 25,28 44,83 8,50 1 
China 255 9,7 6,90 30,10 6,9 33 13 13 705 -19,57 0,02 0,01 -9,00 56,72 9,65 1 
India 442 17,6 4,10 14,90 8,1 38 17 5 494 -9,95 0,03 0,00 34,35 30,44 5,34 1 
Mexico 35 3,3 9,20 17,80 7,4 47 15 17 931 3,95 0,16 0,02 46,85 38,60 10,10 1 
Poland -42 2,8 6,10 17,90 7,1 54 9 25 717 6,30 0,24 0,12 32,90 53,97 4,40 1 
Slovakia -46 4,3 4,20 20,30 8,1 51 11 28 472 42,38 0,18 0,12 31,48 49,42 3,43 1 
Turkey 389 8,0 4,20 17,80 5,1 50 14 18 799 22,98 0,07 0,13 38,67 39,00 6,10 1 
Australia -5 2,5 9,90 6,80 8,8 50 22 49 636 10,17 1,28 0,21 14,98 58,80 5,49 2 
Canada 8 1,5 9,80 10,70 7,2 52 19 46 228 4,95 0,62 0,25 15,98 63,36 6,81 2 
Norway -40 1,6 25,10 7,90 5,8 51 12 67 273 31,25 0,58 0,62 20,70 56,18 3,17 2 
Russia -11 4,2 13,70 15,60 6,5 42 18 24 044 -25,66 0,05 0,00 8,61 63,96 5,04 2 
South Africa 20 2,5 12,10 13,30 4,1 47 21 14 460 -22,34 0,46 0,01 22,09 51,87 10,83 2 
Austria -23 1,4 3,10 18,00 6,2 56 15 48 457 32,81 0,59 0,12 16,76 63,70 3,39 3 
Czech Republic -50 2,6 5,60 25,50 5,4 47 13 30 400 1,65 0,48 0,09 26,13 51,71 3,06 3 
Estonia -75 3,4 5,70 15,50 6,4 55 14 29 155 -14,69 1,52 0,00 13,04 61,04 4,10 3 
Germany -51 0,7 3,00 21,80 4,4 54 15 46 617 5,14 0,30 0,72 19,21 62,79 3,75 3 
Greece -10 3,9 3,50 9,50 3,0 59 22 27 065 35,06 0,64 0,09 41,50 57,36 4,64 3 
Hungary -38 4,3 3,20 22,50 4,2 53 11 25 538 18,45 0,71 0,12 18,93 55,78 3,43 3 
Ireland -15 1,6 3,00 19,70 2,9 56 16 47 882 22,43 0,00 0,00 33,81 45,25 3,70 3 
Israel 106 1,3 2,50 14,10 5,4 56 21 35 151 14,89 0,49 1,22 20,41 52,97 8,35 3 
Italy -33 2,1 3,10 15,30 4,9 54 20 34 622 21,42 0,36 0,14 30,23 61,59 4,54 3 
Japan -15 1,2 2,10 18,70 6,1 56 16 37 669 16,52 0,16 0,01 18,70 64,73 4,69 3 
Portugal 4 2,3 3,70 12,90 4,4 58 18 26 738 23,06 0,48 0,00 28,79 59,27 4,82 3 
Slovenia -42 2,1 4,20 22,40 5,5 53 11 31 386 11,35 0,48 0,12 17,34 70,43 2,85 3 
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Country COP21 (%) 
PrimAgri 
(%) 
PrimIndus 
(%) 
SecManuf 
(%) 
SecConst 
(%) 
Ter_Serv 
(%) 
Ter_FIRE 
(%) 
GDPCap 
EmbCO2 
(%) 
IUCN 
GreenP 
(%) 
FinIndex 
(%) 
WShare 
(%) 
ClassGHG Cluster 
South Korea 81 2,3 3,00 30,30 4,9 46 14 37 374 0,92 0,65 0,01 16,78 67,30 6,46 3 
Spain 2 2,4 3,60 12,80 5,2 59 16 33 249 32,76 0,84 0,22 24,40 60,72 4,62 3 
United Kingdom -47 0,7 4,00 10,40 6,0 60 19 40 774 33,81 0,68 0,20 19,83 64,38 4,58 3 
United States -30 1,3 4,40 12,30 4,0 59 19 55 310 13,65 0,29 0,08 22,98 61,65 9,08 3 
Belgium -38 0,7 2,70 13,50 5,6 63 15 46 749 -8,36 1,16 0,85 15,86 66,80 3,57 4 
Denmark -45 1,5 4,60 13,20 4,5 59 17 45 512 36,64 1,77 0,62 14,08 66,13 3,10 4 
Finland -59 2,8 3,50 16,50 6,2 55 16 42 522 22,27 1,10 0,62 17,56 64,55 3,28 4 
France -40 1,6 2,50 11,00 5,6 62 17 39 152 32,34 0,91 0,25 12,24 66,97 3,94 4 
Netherlands -40 1,8 4,50 11,80 4,4 64 13 48 013 16,12 2,25 2,43 21,93 65,87 3,43 4 
New Zealand -11 6,1 5,40 11,90 5,7 50 21 37 173 10,21 2,00 1,11 21,60 54,80 5,90 4 
Sweden -38 1,3 3,40 15,40 5,7 59 13 47 426 47,71 1,13 0,62 8,59 62,74 3,30 4 
Switzerland 
-50 0,8 1,90 19,00 5,3 62 11 58 925 59,07 2,32 1,95 14,86 68,79 4,16 4 
Overall mean 21 3,16 5,74 16,00 5,71 53,14 15,51 35 218 14,70 0,68 0,35 21,61 57,70 5,41 
  Overall standard dev. 118 3,09 4,46 5,39 1,36 6,82 3,79 13 681 19,30 0,62 0,54 10,12 9,10 2,61 
Table 1. Raw data for the PCA, ordered by cluster and alphabetic order. For EmbCO2, a negative number means net exports of CO2. 
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Appendix 2. PCA Results 
   Eigenvalue Percentage of variance Cumulative percentage of variance 
comp 1 4.59 35.29 35.29 
comp 2 1.75 13.44 48.73 
comp 3 1.62 12.48 61.21 
comp 4 1.29 9.95 71.16 
comp 5 1.12 8.59 79.75 
comp 6 0.76 5.84 85.59 
comp 7 0.62 4.78 90.37 
comp 8 0.42 3.25 93.62 
comp 9 0.34 2.62 96.24 
comp 10 0.21 1.63 97.87 
comp 11 0.15 1.14 99.01 
comp 12 0.09 0.72 99.73 
comp 13 0.03 0.27 100 
Total 13     
Mean   7.69   
Table 2. Eigenvalues, percentage of variance and cumulative percentage of variance for each axis. The axes fulfilling the selection threshold are in bold. To choose 
the number of axes to keep we followed the Keiser criterion: We kept the axes with an eigenvalue greater than the average. Since we performed a normalized PCA, 
the sum of eigenvalues is equal to the number of the active variables and so the average eigenvalue is 1. Axes 1 to 5 fulfil the Keiser criterion. We applied three other 
criteria to confirm our choice of keeping five axes: the Elbow, the Scree-Test and the average inertia (variance) criteria. Except for the Scree-test, which indicated to 
keep four axes, the two other criteria confirmed the choice of five axes. The Elbow criterion is a graphical analysis: We keep all the axes above and close to 1 until 
we observe a break before a continuous decrease in the eigenvalues. The Scree-test relies on the nth differences of eigenvalues: We keep all the axes for which the 
nth difference of eigenvalues is positive. Finally, according to the average inertia (or variance) criterion, we keep all axes whose inertia is above the average (here 
7.69%). 
 5 
Variables 
Coordinate values Square cosines Sum of square cosines Contributions 
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Plan 1:2 Plan 1:3 Plan 1:4 Plan 1:5 Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 
PrimAgri -0.72 0.03 -0.07 0.19 0.52 0.53 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.27 0.53 0.53 0.56 0.79 11.45 0.06 0.31 2.94 23.92 
PrimIndus -0.30 -0.16 0.73 0.22 -0.40 0.09 0.03 0.53 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.62 0.14 0.25 2.02 1.53 32.42 3.63 14.13 
SecManuf -0.27 -0.49 -0.75 -0.08 -0.02 0.07 0.24 0.56 0.01 0.00 0.32 0.64 0.08 0.07 1.58 14.02 34.75 0.49 0.04 
SecConst -0.44 -0.33 0.37 0.42 0.07 0.19 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.20 4.24 6.20 8.33 13.66 0.42 
Ter_Serv 
0.87 0.34 -0.09 -0.02 -0.05 0.76 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.00 
0.87 0.77 0.76 0.76 
16.53 6.60 0.46 0.05 0.21 
Ter_FIRE 0.10 0.45 0.33 -0.66 0.26 0.01 0.21 0.11 0.44 0.07 0.22 0.12 0.45 0.08 0.22 11.82 6.78 33.66 5.93 
GDPCap 0.82 -0.11 0.21 0.10 -0.25 0.68 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.69 0.72 0.69 0.74 14.72 0.74 2.82 0.79 5.71 
EmbCO2 0.63 0.33 -0.20 0.38 -0.12 0.40 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.51 0.44 0.55 0.42 8.77 6.29 2.43 11.04 1.31 
IUCN 0.72 -0.16 0.21 0.16 0.51 0.52 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.26 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.78 11.39 1.46 2.60 1.87 23.05 
GreenP 0.64 -0.10 0.15 0.27 0.50 0.41 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.25 0.42 0.44 0.49 0.66 9.00 0.61 1.42 5.77 22.48 
ClassGHG -0.55 0.11 0.31 -0.34 0.09 0.30 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.32 0.40 0.42 0.31 6.64 0.71 5.83 8.85 0.68 
FinIndex 
-0.23 0.82 -0.17 0.31 -0.10 0.05 0.68 0.03 0.10 0.01 
0.73 0.08 0.15 0.06 
1.15 38.86 1.86 7.49 0.96 
WShare 
0.75 -0.44 0.01 -0.36 -0.11 0.56 0.19 0.00 0.13 0.01 
0.76 0.56 0.69 0.58 
12.30 11.11 0.00 9.79 1.17 
Table 3. Coordinates values, square cosines and contributions of the variables to the axes. 
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Figure 1. Plan 1:2 and 1:3 for the variables. The closer a variable to the unit circle, the better its quality of projection. The closer a variable to an axis, the greater its 
correlation with this axis: countries with a high absolute value for this axis will have a high absolute value for that variable. 
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Figure 2. Plan 1:4 and 1:5 for the variables.
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Countries 
Coordinate values Square cosines Sum of square cosines Contributions 
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Plan 1:2 Plan 1:3 Plan 1:4 Plan 1:5 Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 
Australia 
0.26 -0.27 3.12 -0.02 0.34 0.00 0.01 0.66 0.00 0.01 
0.01 0.66 0.00 0.01 
0.04 0.12 16.25 0.00 0.27 
Austria 1.27 -0.48 -0.66 0.13 -0.80 0.36 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.14 0.42 0.46 0.37 0.51 0.95 0.36 0.73 0.04 1.55 
Belgium 2.12 -0.69 0.25 -0.47 0.40 0.51 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.57 0.52 0.54 0.53 2.65 0.74 0.10 0.46 0.38 
Brazil -2.60 0.75 0.83 -0.81 0.21 0.40 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.40 3.99 0.87 1.14 1.38 0.11 
Canada 0.14 -0.44 2.08 -0.63 -0.52 0.00 0.03 0.71 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.71 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.30 7.21 0.84 0.66 
Chile -3.04 -0.74 1.38 2.29 -1.30 0.42 0.02 0.09 0.24 0.08 0.44 0.50 0.65 0.49 5.45 0.85 3.18 10.92 4.07 
China -4.31 -4.02 -0.66 -1.31 1.12 0.46 0.40 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.86 0.47 0.50 0.49 10.96 24.96 0.73 3.56 3.03 
Czech Republic -1.14 -0.70 -1.57 0.34 -0.52 0.19 0.07 0.37 0.02 0.04 0.27 0.56 0.21 0.23 0.77 0.75 4.11 0.24 0.66 
Denmark 2.84 -0.08 0.16 -0.10 0.50 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.85 4.74 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.62 
Estonia -0.04 -1.31 0.37 -0.28 0.59 0.00 0.27 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.27 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.00 2.65 0.23 0.17 0.85 
Finland 1.34 -0.59 -0.15 0.21 0.45 0.60 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.72 0.61 0.62 0.67 1.06 0.54 0.04 0.09 0.48 
France 2.00 0.12 0.09 -0.52 -0.08 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.59 0.59 0.63 0.59 2.36 0.02 0.01 0.56 0.01 
Germany 1.01 -0.68 -1.18 -0.68 -0.49 0.18 0.08 0.25 0.08 0.04 0.26 0.43 0.26 0.22 0.60 0.72 2.31 0.97 0.59 
Greece 0.75 3.40 -0.45 -0.91 0.12 0.04 0.77 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.80 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.33 17.86 0.34 1.72 0.04 
Hungary -0.21 -0.54 -2.03 0.27 -0.04 0.01 0.05 0.68 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.69 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.45 6.84 0.15 0.00 
India -5.69 1.18 -0.20 1.60 2.79 0.66 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.16 0.69 0.67 0.72 0.82 19.08 2.17 0.07 5.34 18.83 
Ireland 0.24 1.83 -1.81 -0.25 -1.28 0.00 0.28 0.27 0.01 0.14 0.28 0.28 0.01 0.14 0.03 5.16 5.45 0.13 3.96 
Israel 0.55 0.98 0.53 -1.01 1.07 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.08 0.18 0.19 0.18 1.48 0.46 2.12 2.75 
Italy 0.38 1.24 -0.50 -0.93 -0.32 0.04 0.40 0.07 0.23 0.03 0.44 0.10 0.26 0.06 0.09 2.38 0.42 1.81 0.25 
Japan 0.38 -0.31 -0.86 -0.73 -0.82 0.04 0.03 0.21 0.15 0.19 0.07 0.25 0.19 0.24 0.09 0.15 1.23 1.10 1.64 
Mexico -3.38 1.72 0.38 0.94 -0.38 0.57 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.72 0.58 0.62 0.58 6.74 4.56 0.24 1.84 0.36 
Netherlands 3.99 -0.28 0.59 1.25 2.24 0.57 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.18 0.57 0.58 0.62 0.75 9.39 0.12 0.58 3.25 12.15 
New Zealand 0.62 0.38 1.37 -0.03 2.61 0.04 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.65 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.69 0.23 0.22 3.15 0.00 16.45 
Norway 0.97 -0.48 3.29 2.28 -2.61 0.03 0.01 0.37 0.18 0.23 0.04 0.40 0.21 0.26 0.55 0.36 17.98 10.84 16.43 
Poland -1.19 -0.09 -0.78 1.48 -0.88 0.20 0.00 0.08 0.31 0.11 0.20 0.28 0.51 0.31 0.84 0.01 1.00 4.57 1.89 
Portugal 0.38 1.53 -0.51 -0.75 -0.36 0.03 0.56 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.60 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.08 3.62 0.44 1.18 0.32 
 9 
Countries 
Coordinate values Square cosines Sum of square cosines Contributions 
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Plan 1:2 Plan 1:3 Plan 1:4 Plan 1:5 Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 
Russia -2.17 -1.85 1.58 -1.31 -0.56 0.30 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.02 0.53 0.47 0.42 0.32 2.77 5.32 4.18 3.61 0.75 
Slovakia -1.13 0.20 -1.28 2.28 -0.57 0.12 0.00 0.15 0.47 0.03 0.12 0.26 0.59 0.14 0.75 0.06 2.72 10.90 0.79 
Slovenia 0.36 -1.55 -1.52 -0.08 -0.83 0.02 0.36 0.35 0.00 0.10 0.38 0.37 0.02 0.12 0.08 3.69 3.84 0.01 1.65 
South Africa -2.34 0.73 1.61 -2.36 0.03 0.31 0.03 0.15 0.31 0.00 0.34 0.45 0.62 0.31 3.22 0.83 4.34 11.61 0.00 
South Korea -0.52 -1.93 -1.88 -1.28 -0.36 0.02 0.32 0.31 0.14 0.01 0.35 0.33 0.17 0.03 0.16 5.76 5.87 3.45 0.32 
Spain 1.06 0.91 -0.31 0.02 -0.12 0.39 0.29 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.68 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.66 1.28 0.16 0.00 0.04 
Sweden 2.39 -0.74 -0.39 0.75 -0.13 0.64 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.70 0.66 0.70 0.64 3.37 0.84 0.26 1.19 0.04 
Switzerland 4.58 -1.11 -0.56 1.78 1.46 0.68 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.72 0.69 0.78 0.75 12.38 1.89 0.53 6.60 5.13 
Turkey -2.40 1.93 -1.34 1.08 0.43 0.44 0.28 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.72 0.57 0.53 0.45 3.39 5.78 2.98 2.46 0.45 
United Kingdom 1.59 0.80 0.50 -0.50 -0.46 0.44 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.55 0.49 0.49 0.48 1.48 0.98 0.42 0.52 0.52 
United States 0.94 1.17 0.50 -1.74 -0.90 0.10 0.15 0.03 0.33 0.09 0.25 0.12 0.43 0.19 0.52 2.13 0.42 6.32 1.96 
Table 4. Coordinates values, square cosines and contributions of the countries to the axes. The greater its coordinate on an axis, the greater the country’s 
contribution to this axis. 
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Figure 3. Plan 1:2 to 1:5 for the countries. Countries with a high absolute value for an axis will have a high absolute value for the correlated variables. 
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Figure 4. Plan 1:4 to 1:5 for the countries 
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Pearson 
correlations PrimAgri PrimIndus SecManuf SecConst Ter_Serv Ter_FIRE GDPCap GreenP EmbCO2 IUCN FinIndex WShare ClassGHG 
PrimAgri 
1 0.029 0.159 0.35** -0.670*** -0.021 -0.672*** -0.246 -0.363** -0.288 0.142 -0.660*** 0.232 
PrimIndus 
0.029 1 -0.336** 0.309* -0.43*** -0.124 0.040 -0.133 -0.295* -0.172 -0.050 -0.208 0.234 
SecManuf 
0.159 -0.336** 1 -0.073 -0.392** -0.423*** -0.261 -0.183 -0.207 -0.273 -0.181 -0.004 -0.038 
SecConst 
0.354** 0.309* -0.073 1 -0.475*** -0.228 -0.233 -0.182 -0.230 -0.138 -0.124 -0.264 0.161 
Ter_Serv 
-0.670*** -0.43*** -0.392** -0.475*** 1 0.135 0.601*** 0.460*** 0.641*** 0.516*** 0.071 0.538*** -0.398*** 
Ter_FIRE 
-0.021 -0.124 -0.42*** -0.228 0.135 1 0.046 -0.048 -0.072 0.066 0.054 0.08 0.166 
GDPCap 
-0.672*** 0.040 -0.261 -0.233 0.601*** 0.046 1 0.500*** 0.510*** 0.501*** -0.257 0.594*** -0.468*** 
EmbCO2 
-0.363** -0.295* -0.20 -0.230 0.641*** -0.072 0.510*** 0.314* 1 0.327** 0.164 0.228 -0.401*** 
GreenP 
-0.246 -0.133 -0.183 -0.182 0.460*** -0.048 0.500*** 1 0.314* 0.750*** -0.165 0.321** -0.232 
IUCN 
-0.288* -0.172 -0.273 -0.138 0.516*** 0.066 0.501*** 0.750*** 0.327** 1 -0.290* 0.499*** -0.357** 
FinIndex 
0.142 -0.050 -0.181 -0.124 0.071 0.054 -0.257 -0.165 0.164 -0.290* 1 -0.614*** 0.042 
WShare 
-0.660*** -0.208 -0.004 -0.264 0.538*** 0.089 0.594*** 0.321** 0.228 0.499*** -0.614*** 1 -0.39** 
ClassGHG 
0.232 0.234 -0.038 0.161 -0.398*** 0.166 -0.468*** -0.232 -0.401*** -0.357** 0.042 -0.39** 1 
Table 5. Correlations matrix for the PCA. Significant at 1% level:***. Significant at 5% level:**. Significant at 10% level:*. 
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Appendix 3. Results of the clustering 
Cluster Axis COP21 (%) Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 
1 
Mean 171 -2.97 
    
0.94 
  
St. dev. 175 1.43 1.25 
2 
Mean -6 
    
2.34   
  
St. dev. 20 0.73 
 
3 
Mean -15 
    
-0.71 -0.52 
  
St. dev. 46 0.86 0.57 
4 
Mean -40 2.49 
      
0.93 
St. dev. 13 1.22 0.98 
Table 6. Characterization of the clusters by the axes obtained from the PCA. 
Cluster Variables PrimAgri PrimIndus  SecManuf  SecConst Ter_Serv  Ter_FIRE  GDPCap EmbCO2 IUCN GreenP FinIndex Wshare ClassGHG 
1 
Test value 
3.7     3.2 -3.2 -2.6 -3.8   -2.9     -4.3 2.8 
2   4.5 -2.3                     
3   -2.5   -3.0                   
4         2.8   2.4 2.0 4.6 4.1   2.4   
Table 7. Test-values from the clustering. The test value shows the significance of a variable to characterize a class: if the absolute value of the v-test is higher than 
1.96 then the values of the variable i for the class j are not random and the variable is statistically significant for this class. The greater the absolute test value, the 
more significant the variable i for the class j. A negative test value indicates that the value of the variable for this class is below the overall mean, while a positive test 
value indicates that the variable is above the overall mean. 
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Appendix 4. R code for the PCA and the clustering 
###Workfile directory### 
setwd("Pathway to workfile directory") 
###FactoMineR package### 
library(FactoMineR) 
###Importing the data from the csv file### 
v11_strucprod <- read.table(“Pathway to csv datafile", header=TRUE, sep=";", na.strings="NA", 
dec=",", row.names=1,  
  strip.white=TRUE) 
summary(v11_strucprod) 
###Correlations matrix### 
library(lattice, pos=17) 
library(survival, pos=17) 
library(Formula, pos=17) 
library(ggplot2, pos=17) 
library(Hmisc, pos=17) 
rcorr.adjust(Données[,c("ClassGHG","EmbCO2","FinIndex","GDPCap","GreenP","IUCN","PrimAgri","Pr
imIndus","SecConst","SecManuf","Ter_FIRE","Ter_Serv","WShare")], type="pearson", 
use="complete") 
###PCA### 
Strucprod.PCA<-v11_strucprod[, c("PrimAgri", "PrimIndus", "SecManuf", "SecConst", "Ter_Serv", 
"Ter_FIRE", "GDPCap", "EmbCO2", "IUCN", "GreenP", "ClassGHG", "FinIndex", "WShare")] 
Strucprod_res<-PCA(Strucprod.PCA , scale.unit=TRUE, ncp=13, graph = FALSE) 
###Plotting the results### 
plot.PCA(Strucprod_res, axes=c(1, 2), choix="ind", cex=1.5, cex.main=2, cex.lab=1.5, 
habillage="none", col.ind="black", col.ind.sup="blue", col.quali="magenta", label=c("ind", 
"ind.sup", "quali"),new.plot=TRUE, title="Countries 1:2", shadow=TRUE, auto="y") 
plot.PCA(Strucprod_res, axes=c(1, 2), choix="var", cex=1.5, cex.main=2, cex.lab=1.5, 
new.plot=TRUE, col.var="black", col.quanti.sup="blue", label=c("var", "quanti.sup"), 
lim.cos2.var=0, title="Variables 1:2",shadow=TRUE, auto="y") 
plot.PCA(Strucprod_res, axes=c(1, 3), choix="ind", cex=1.5, cex.main=2, cex.lab=1.5, 
habillage="none", col.ind="black", col.ind.sup="blue", col.quali="magenta", label=c("ind", 
"ind.sup", "quali"),new.plot=TRUE, title="Countries 1:3",shadow=TRUE, auto="y") 
plot.PCA(Strucprod_res, axes=c(1, 3), choix="var", cex=1.5, cex.main=2, cex.lab=1.5, 
new.plot=TRUE, col.var="black", col.quanti.sup="blue", label=c("var", "quanti.sup"), 
lim.cos2.var=0, title="Variables 1:3",shadow=TRUE, auto="y") 
plot.PCA(Strucprod_res, axes=c(1, 4), choix="ind", cex=1.5, cex.main=2, cex.lab=1.5, 
habillage="none", col.ind="black", col.ind.sup="blue", col.quali="magenta", label=c("ind", 
"ind.sup", "quali"),new.plot=TRUE, title="Countries 1:4",shadow=TRUE, auto="y") 
plot.PCA(Strucprod_res, axes=c(1, 4), choix="var", cex=1.5, cex.main=2, cex.lab=1.5, 
new.plot=TRUE, col.var="black", col.quanti.sup="blue", label=c("var", "quanti.sup"), 
lim.cos2.var=0, title="Variables 1:4",shadow=TRUE, auto="y") 
plot.PCA(Strucprod_res, axes=c(1, 5), choix="ind", cex=1.5, cex.main=2, cex.lab=1.5, 
habillage="none", col.ind="black", col.ind.sup="blue", col.quali="magenta", label=c("ind", 
"ind.sup", "quali"),new.plot=TRUE, title="Countries 1:5",shadow=TRUE, auto="y") 
plot.PCA(Strucprod_res, axes=c(1, 5), choix="var", cex=1.5, cex.main=2, cex.lab=1.5, 
new.plot=TRUE, col.var="black", col.quanti.sup="blue", label=c("var", "quanti.sup"), 
lim.cos2.var=0, title="Variables 1:5",shadow=TRUE, auto="y") 
###Summarizing the results and writing in a csv file### 
summary(Strucprod_res, nb.dec = 3, nbelements=10, nbind = 10, ncp = 3, file="") 
write.infile(Strucprod_res$eig, file ="v11_Strucprod_res",append=FALSE) 
write.infile(Strucprod_res$var, file ="v11_Strucprod_res",append=TRUE) 
write.infile(Strucprod_res$ind, file ="v11_Strucprod_res",append=TRUE) 
write.infile(dimdesc(Strucprod_res, axes=1:13), file ="v11_Strucprod_res",append=TRUE) 
remove(Strucprod.PCA) 
###Clustering on the selected axes from the PCA### 
v11_strucprod.PCA<-v11_strucprod[, c("PrimAgri", "PrimIndus", "SecManuf", "SecConst", 
"Ter_Serv", "Ter_FIRE", "GDPCap", "EmbCO2", "IUCN", "GreenP", "ClassGHG", "FinIndex", 
"WShare")] 
res<-PCA(v11_strucprod.PCA , scale.unit=TRUE, ncp=5, graph = FALSE) 
res.hcpc<-HCPC(res ,nb.clust=0,consol=TRUE,min=3,max=10,graph=TRUE) 
res.hcpc$data.clust[,ncol(res.hcpc$data.clust),drop=F] 
res.hcpc$desc.var 
res.hcpc$desc.axes 
res.hcpc$desc.ind 
res.hcpc$call$t 
summary(res, nb.dec = 3, nbelements = 13, nbind = 37, ncp = 4, file="v11_classi_res") 
write.infile(res.hcpc$data.clust, file ="v11_classi_res",append=FALSE) 
write.infile(res.hcpc$desc.var, file ="v11_classi_res",append=TRUE) 
#write.infile(res.hcpc$desc.ind, file ="v11_classi_res",append=TRUE) 
write.infile(res.hcpc$desc.axes, file ="v11_classi_res",append=TRUE) 
write.infile(res.hcpc$call$t, file ="v11_classi_res",append=TRUE) 
remove(v11_strucprod.PCA)  
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Appendix 5. EU countries’ individual COP21 objectives 
The INDC submitted by the European Union stated a common objective of a 40% reduction 
GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 1990, which encompassed all the sectors of the 
economy. On July 20
th
 2016, the European Commission released preliminary national 
emissions targets for 2030 regarding the sectors not covered by the EU Emissions Trading 
System (EUETS): agriculture, construction, waste management, transportation, CO2 capture 
and storage as well as LULUCF. These sectors are to reduce their total emissions by 30% 
relative to 2005. The sectors included in the EUETS are subject to an objective of a 43% 
reduction in emissions by 2030 relatively to 2005 (European Commission, 2016). These 
sectors are  
“heavy energy-using installations consisting of power stations and other combustion plants with ≥ 20MW 
thermal rated input (except hazardous or municipal waste installations), oil refineries, coke ovens, iron 
and steel, cement clinker, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board, aluminium, 
petrochemicals, ammonia, nitric, adipic and glyoxylic acid production, CO2 capture, transport in 
pipelines and geological storage of CO2. The aviation scope of the EU ETS is limited to flights within the 
EEA until 2016 (...).” (European Commission, n.d., p. 20) 
To calculate the value of the COP21 variable for the EU countries of our sample, we first 
computed the share of the ETS sectors in 2005 total emissions and deducted the share of the 
non-ETS sectors using UNFCC and Eurostat aggregate and sectorial emissions data. We then 
applied the announced mitigation rates to obtain 2030 emissions and finally computed the 
mitigation equivalencies in terms of 1990 emissions. The table below details the data and 
computations. Our results are consistent with the data provided by the European Commission 
and the INDC: a share of roughly 60% of the non-ETS sectors in total emissions, respective 
mitigations for ETS and non-ETS sectors of 43% and 32% relatively to 2005 and a overall 
mitigation of 40% of 1990 emissions by 2030 upon the total emissions of all the EU countries 
of our sample. 
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Label 
1. Share 
of ETS 
sectors in 
total 
2005 
emissions 
2. Share 
of non-
ETS 
sectors in 
total 2005 
emissions  
[1 - (1)] 
3. Total 
2005 
emissions 
4. ETS 
sectors 
2005 
emissions 
[(1)*(3)] 
5. Non-
ETS 
sectors 
2005 
emissions 
[(2)*(3)] 
6. ETS 
sectors 
2030 
target in 
% of 2005 
7. Non-
ETS 
sectors 
2030 
target in 
% of 2005 
8. ETS 
absolute 
mitigation 
by 2030 
[(4)*(6)] 
9. Non-
ETS 
absolute 
mitigation 
by 2030 
[(5)*(7)] 
10. Total 
absolute 
mitigation by 
2030 
[(8) + (9)] 
11. 2030 
total 
emissions 
[(3) - 
(10)] 
12. Total 
mitigation by 
2030 in % of 
2005 
[((11) - 
(3))/(3)] 
13. Total 
1990 
Emissions 
14. Total 
mitigation by 
2030 in % of 
1990 
[((11) - 
(13))/(13)] 
Austria 29,9% 70,1% 84 956 25 381 59 574 43% 36% 10 914 21 447 32 361 52 595 -38,1% 68 209 -22,9% 
Belgium 30,5% 69,5% 140 889 43 035 97 854 43% 35% 18 505 34 249 52 754 88 135 -37,4% 142 118 -38,0% 
Czech Republic 56,5% 43,5% 139 543 78 774 60 769 43% 14% 33 873 8 508 42 380 97 162 -30,4% 192 708 -49,6% 
Denmark 35,6% 64,4% 70 065 24 924 45 141 43% 39% 10 717 17 605 28 322 41 743 -40,4% 75 303 -44,6% 
Estonia 96,1% 3,9% 13 432 12 907 525 43% 13% 5 550 68 5 618 7 814 -41,8% 31 806 -75,4% 
Finland 79,6% 20,4% 40 059 31 890 8 169 43% 39% 13 713 3 186 16 899 23 160 -42,2% 56 654 -59,1% 
France 25,6% 74,4% 522 761 133 936 388 825 43% 37% 57 592 143 865 201 458 321 304 -38,5% 531 764 -39,6% 
Germany 43,5% 56,5% 1 003 577 436 307 567 270 43% 38% 187 612 215 562 403 175 600 402 -40,2% 1 223 531 -50,9% 
Greece 51,3% 48,7% 132 641 68 073 64 568 43% 16% 29 272 10 331 39 602 93 039 -29,9% 102 821 -9,5% 
Hungary 32,1% 67,9% 73 367 23 536 49 830 43% 7% 10 121 3 488 13 609 59 758 -18,5% 95 636 -37,5% 
Ireland 25,5% 74,5% 67 442 17 219 50 223 43% 30% 7 404 15 067 22 471 44 971 -33,3% 52 934 -15,0% 
Italy 40,0% 60,0% 544 715 217 690 327 026 43% 33% 93 607 107 919 201 525 343 190 -37,0% 515 446 -33,4% 
Netherlands 39,8% 60,2% 211 729 84 206 127 522 43% 36% 36 209 45 908 82 117 129 612 -38,8% 214 863 -39,7% 
Poland 57,4% 42,6% 353 943 203 066 150 877 43% 7% 87 318 10 561 97 880 256 063 -27,7% 440 865 -41,9% 
Portugal 37,2% 62,8% 86 071 31 988 54 083 43% 17% 13 755 9 194 22 949 63 122 -26,7% 60 920 3,6% 
Slovakia 39,6% 60,4% 45 847 18 172 27 675 43% 12% 7 814 3 321 11 135 34 712 -24,3% 64 595 -46,3% 
Slovenia 70,9% 29,1% 15 035 10 662 4 373 43% 15% 4 585 656 5 241 9 794 -34,9% 16 960 -42,3% 
Spain 43,4% 56,6% 399 209 173 397 225 812 43% 26% 74 561 58 711 133 272 265 937 -33,4% 260 444 2,1% 
Sweden 57,5% 42,5% 36 011 20 722 15 288 43% 40% 8 911 6 115 15 026 20 985 -41,7% 34 027 -38,3% 
United Kingdom 37,1% 62,9% 682 587 253 297 429 290 43% 37% 108 917 158 837 267 755 414 832 -39,2% 785 291 -47,2% 
    
Share of ETS and 
non ETS sectors in 
total 2005 emissions 
40,9% 59,1% 
ETS and non-ETS 
mitigation in % of 
ETS and non-ETS 
2005 emissions 
43% 32% 
Total mitigation in % of 
total 2005 emissions 
-36,4% 
Total 
mitigation in 
% of total 
1990 
emissions 
-40,2% 
Table 8. Calculations of EU members individual mitigation objective, taking into account objective for both ETS and non-ETS sectors. Sources: calculus from the 
author based on emissions data from Eurostat and UNFCC and mitigations data from the European Commission. 
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Appendix 6. Comparisons of the varieties of carbon voluntarism with the IPCC benchmark 
Clusters Countries 
2010 
emissions 
 
Mitigation 
according to 
IPCC 
scenario 
RCP2.6 
2050 
emissions 
following 
scenario 
RCP2.6 
Average 
annual 
mitigation 
rate 2010-
2050 
2030 
emissions at 
average 
annual 
mitigation 
rate 2010-
2050 
Mitigation 
2010-2030 in 
% of 2010 
1990 
emissions 
IPCC 
mitigation 
2030-1990 in 
% of 1990 
IPCC 
clusters 
average 
(%) 
COP21 
clusters 
average (%) 
Carbon 
voluntarism 
1 
Brazil 2 902 243 55% 1 306 009 -2,0% 1 946 883 2,0% 1 606 209 21% 
3 171 Very Low 
Chile 114 285 80% 22 857 -3,9% 51 109 4,1% 54 730 -7% 
China 11 183 811 55% 5 032 715 -2,0% 7 502 327 2,0% 3 892 675 93% 
India 2 771 457 55% 1 247 156 -2,0% 1 859 149 2,0% 1 387 372 34% 
Mexico 643 375 55% 289 519 -2,0% 431 588 2,0% 494 151 -13% 
Poland 426 486 80% 85 297 -3,9% 190 729 4,1% 474 016 -60% 
Slovakia 49 973 80% 9 995 -3,9% 22 348 4,1% 72 262 -69% 
Turkey 422 722 55% 190 225 -2,0% 283 569 2,0% 224 459 26% 
2 
Australia 782 103 80% 156 421 -3,9% 349 766 4,1% 482 298 -27% 
-42 -6 Low 
Canada 764 138 80% 152 828 -3,9% 341 732 4,1% 608 685 -44% 
Norway 65 710 80% 13 142 -3,9% 29 385 4,1% 67 466 -56% 
Russia 2 603 290 80% 520 658 -3,9% 1 164 226 4,1% 3 593 582 -68% 
South Africa 456 538 55% 205 442 -2,0% 306 254 2,0% 349 202 -12% 
3 
Austria 94 172 80% 18 834 -3,9% 42 114 4,1% 79 837 -47% 
-51 -15 Low 
Czech Republic 145 707 80% 29 141 -3,9% 65 161 4,1% 196 207 -67% 
Estonia 22 767 80% 4 553 -3,9% 10 181 4,1% 55 787 -82% 
Germany 948 007 80% 189 601 -3,9% 423 961 4,1% 1 256 074 -66% 
Greece 107 506 80% 21 501 -3,9% 48 077 4,1% 96 659 -50% 
Hungary 66 251 80% 13 250 -3,9% 29 627 4,1% 97 552 -70% 
Ireland 65 591 80% 13 118 -3,9% 29 332 4,1% 65 583 -55% 
Israel 79 072 80% 15 814 -3,9% 35 361 4,1% 39 609 -11% 
Italy 489 460 80% 97 892 -3,9% 218 892 4,1% 508 765 -57% 
Japan 1 350 428 80% 270 086 -3,9% 603 929 4,1% 1 304 676 -54% 
Portugal 71 681 80% 14 336 -3,9% 32 056 4,1% 58 227 -45% 
Slovenia 21 894 80% 4 379 -3,9% 9 790 4,1% 19 978 -51% 
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Clusters Countries 
2010 
emissions 
 
Mitigation 
according to 
IPCC 
scenario 
RCP2.6 
2050 
emissions 
following 
scenario 
RCP2.6 
Average 
annual 
mitigation 
rate 2010-
2050 
2030 
emissions at 
average 
annual 
mitigation 
rate 2010-
2050 
Mitigation 
2010-2030 in 
% of 2010 
1990 
emissions 
IPCC 
mitigation 
2030-1990 in 
% of 1990 
IPCC 
clusters 
average 
(%) 
COP21 
clusters 
average (%) 
Carbon 
voluntarism 
South Korea 628 839 80% 125 768 -3,9% 281 224 4,1% 300 501 -6% 
Spain 354 618 80% 70 924 -3,9% 158 589 4,1% 293 343 -46% 
United Kingdom 609 587 80% 121 917 -3,9% 272 614 4,1% 777 244 -65% 
United States 6 713 349 80% 1 342 670 -3,9% 3 002 300 4,1% 6 136 094 -51% 
4 
Belgium 138 029 80% 27 606 -3,9% 61 728 4,1% 137 873 -55% 
-55 -40 High 
Denmark 63 679 80% 12 736 -3,9% 28 477 4,1% 72 484 -61% 
Finland 84 372 80% 16 874 -3,9% 37 731 4,1% 75 555 -50% 
France 532 133 80% 106 427 -3,9% 237 976 4,1% 554 685 -57% 
Netherlands 212 418 80% 42 484 -3,9% 94 995 4,1% 224 468 -58% 
New Zealand 76 142 80% 15 228 -3,9% 34 051 4,1% 65 690 -48% 
Sweden 71 435 80% 14 287 -3,9% 31 946 4,1% 77 171 -59% 
Switzerland 57 154 80% 11 431 -3,9% 25 559 4,1% 56 394 -55% 
Table 9. Comparison between our typology of carbon voluntarisms and the IPCC scenario RCP2.6 taken as a benchmark (IPCC, 2014). Scenario 2.6 is the only one 
with a 66-100% probability (likely) to maintain climate change below 2 degrees. It requires a global GHG mitigation of 41 to 72% by 2050 relatively to 2010. Since 
IPCC reports are scientific works whose public results are negotiated with States representatives to reach a politically acceptable consensus, it appears reasonable 
from a climatic point of view to consider the upper limit of the given interval. In order to reach a collective mitigation of roughly 70% by 2050 relatively to 2010, we 
therefore assumed high income countries’ benchmark mitigation is 80% and middle income countries’ benchmark mitigation is 55%. We followed the World Bank 
classification for high income and middle income countries
1
. We then computed the average annual mitigation rates between 2010 (IPCC base year) and 2050 to 
achieve the benchmark mitigations and then the 2030 emissions if these benchmark average annual mitigation rates are respected. Finally, we computed the 
mitigation rate by 2030 in terms of 1990 emissions to compare with INDCs submitted for the COP21. Carbon voluntarisms are ranked from very low to high 
according to the following rules: very low means an increase in GHG emissions by 2030; low means a mitigation of less than half the benchmark rate; average means 
a mitigation from half to two thirds of the benchmark rate; high means a mitigation from two thirds of the benchmark rate onwards.
                                                 
1
 http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups#High_income, accessed June 6, 2016. 
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